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RESUMEN: Este estudio tiene como objetivo definir y explorar el surgimiento y desarrollo de lo 
mentalización y el funcionamiento reflexivo. El funcionamiento reflexivo se refiere a los procesos 
psicológicos que son sustanciales para la mentalización. Este es un estudio de revision y tiene como 
resultados que la mentalización y el funcionamiento reflexivo son diferentes de otros términos 
relacionados con la comprensión de los estados mentales tales como los pensamientos, los 
sentimientos, etc. El déficit en la mentalización y el funcionamiento reflexivo da como resultado 
problemas interpersonales fundamentales. Dado a que la mentalización y el funcionamiento reflexivo 
son capacidades que se está formando y desarrollando desde el nacimiento y con la relación con los 
demás; es crucial que se tengan en cuenta en la investigación y la práctica clínica. 
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ABSTRACT: This study is aimed to define and explore the emergence and development of 
mentalization and reflective functioning. Reflective functioning is referred to the psychological 
processes that are substantial for mentalizing. This is a review study. As results, mentalization and 
reflective functioning are different from other terms relating to understanding the mental states 
such as thoughts, feelings, desires or goals. Moreover, mentalization and reflective functioning are 
different as a matter of evaluating this characteristic. Deficit in mentalizing and reflective 
functioning results in fundamental interpersonal problems. Since mentalization or reflective 
functioning is a capacity that one is forming and developing from birth through the relationship 
with others and its deficit undermine the disturbances, it is crucial to be considered in research and 
clinical practice. 
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INTRODUCTION. 
In recent years, the attention of developmental psychologists has focused on the remarkable capacity 




Reflective functioning is an acquired developmental skill that allows the child to respond not only to 
the behavior of others, but also to the perception of their beliefs, feelings, hopes, manifestations, 
plans, etc. Reflective functioning or mentalization enables the child to "read" the minds of the people 
(1). The behavior of others is going to be meaningful and predictable to the child by attributing the 
mental states.  
Whether in the time of love or hatred, peace or war, or even at the moment of everyday life, humans 
try to understand their own and others minds. They use the understanding of the mental states of 
goals, feelings, thoughts, desires, and beliefs to understand, and more importantly, predict the 
behavior of each other (2). This perception is reflected in an emotional process that Fonagy and 
colleagues refer to as mentalization. 
DEVELOPMENT. 
The function of reflection is the capacity for mentalization in the narrative of the lives of individuals. 
The capacity for mentalization is created in functional manner that caregiver reads and controls the 
child's inner states and forms the child's ability to understand himself; an understanding beyond the 
caregiver who has desires, emotions, thoughts and wishes that are different from others. The child's 
final capacity depends on the reflective capacities of the parent to understand their inner experiences. 
Whatever the parents are aware of their inner states and on the other hand, they can understand the 
child's inner state and subsequently anticipate his behavior, the capacity for mentalization and better 
reflective functioning is created in the child. 
The term reflective functioning is considered to be psychological processes, which is the basis of the 
capacity for mentalization. This concept is evident both in the psychoanalysis literature (3) and in 
cognitive psychology (4). The reflective functioning or the mentalization is the active expression of 
this psychological capacity that is precisely representative of the self (5). The reflective functioning 
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has both self-reflective and interpersonal components that ideally gives an extended capacity to 
individuals in order to distinguish the external reality from the internal reality and express the "real" 
states of functionality with the environment, mental processes, and intrapersonal emotions of 
interpersonal relationships. 
In the psychoanalysis literature, several concepts have been introduced to represent mental processes 
that overlap with the construct of mentalization and reflective functioning. This group of concepts 
emanate from Freud's basic concept of "bindung" in German or “linking” in English. When Freud 
distinguished between primary and secondary processes, he emphasized that "having a link" is a 
qualitative change from a physical (close) relationship to a psychological relationship (6). The term 
of Melanie Klein's Depression Position can be referred to as the term acquisition of reflective 
functioning, which necessarily recognizes the harm or suffering in the other and the individual in the 
process. Winnicott (7) also introduced the importance of the child's caregiver psychological 
understanding in order to actual self-creation. Moreover, Winnicott is primarily a psychoanalytic 
theorist of self-development, which states that self-psychology evolves through one's perception of 
one's own thinking and feeling of another person. Parents who cannot reflect and understand the inner 
experiences of their children, deprive their children of a central psychological structure that makes 
them a critical part of their lives. 
On the other hand, French psychoanalysts created a term of mentalization that was formed from the 
point of view of economics. Pierre Marty discussed mentalization as a guardian shield in the semi-
conscious system that prevents advanced maladaptation (8). He considered mentalization as stimuli 
and mental imagery that creates "fluidity" and "stability" (9). Mentalization ensures the freedom in 
the use of relationships to the consistency and stability. At the same time, Pierre Luckett (10) 
discussed about the evolution of various forms of thinking and organization of the re-organization of 
the inner experience along with this evolution. 
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Fonagy believed that the word “mentalization” must be referred to action, in other words, 
mentalizatoin is a practice that the individual is doing at any moment. Therefore, instead of 
mentalization, he uses the word “mentalizing”. Mentalizing is something we do or fail to do it right. 
Mentalizing is an action, and more of the mentalization is what we do in the interactive environment. 
Ideally, when individuals interact, their attention is directed to mental states, the mind of the others 






                                                     Figure1. Mentalizing interactivity. 
Reflective functioning in clinical psychology. 
Clinical practitioners and therapists tend to mentalize and encourage their patients to mentalize (11). 
In the counseling and treatment environment, in order to have working alliance, a common agreement 
between the therapist and the clients, therapists should be able to identify what is happening in their 
own and their patients and intervene based on that. Subsequently, to have an effective treatment, the 
therapist also has to go through his own self, as well as his perceptions of the word and the way the 
therapist speaks to solve the problem. This process is formed as reflective functioning. In other words, 
the reflective functioning of the instantaneous therapist should be in line with the understanding of 
the patient's problem and the choice of the effective intervention in an effective time, and the 
reflection function of the moment at the time of the client must also be in order to express of their 
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problems and cooperating to have an effective intervention and working alliance. The reflective 
functioning occurs in two domains, which is described below. 
Mentalization and Emotion. 
The word mentalization can be mistakenly enclosed in a range where the character of "mental" is 
attributed to cognitive and logic against "emotion." However, the meaning of mentalization is covered 
with emotion. Many of the mental contexts that we are eager to mentalize are the emotional states of 
ourselves or others. The process of mentalization of emotional states is also emotional itself. 
Most clinical work is done in this way: Thinking about emotions in person and others. We do not 
think of emotions in a non-emotional way, in other words, we feel feelings, for example, when we 
feel anger, we are anxious or embarrassed (11). 
Explicit mentalization. 
The easy facet for mentalizing is that when we think and talk about our mental states. Clinical 
professionals continuously mentalize, for example, they think talk (emotionally) about thoughts, 
beliefs, emotions, desires and motives of patients. Moreover, clinicians engage their patients in this 
explicit mental process, encouraging them to think and talk (emotionally) with themselves. 
Fundamentally, explicit mentalizing pertains to self and others. The processes we mentalize about 
ourselves and other persons are substantially different from each other (12). Knowing one’s own mind 
is no less daunting than knowing the others' minds, and if self- knowledge was fallible, the 
psychologists did not have business (11). 
We mentalize in different timeframes. We often mentalize about the present state of mind; for 
example, thinking how we feel at the moment. We also think about past mental states; for example, 
thinking about why someone does something, and we can predict future mental states; for example, 
thinking what someone would feel if we say something. Most of the explicit mentalization that 
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clinicians facilitate in therapy session happens after a real incident, they urge patients to reflect their 
past behaviors from their minds and categorize how the disturbed interactions are revealed. 
In relation to different molds when they have different domains, we can focus on precisely the mental 
state at a time, such as how the person feels, and examine himself with the involvement of recent 
events, such as what has recently led to that particular feeling. We can also extend the breadth of our 
vision to past history, such as how childhood experiences can relate to this phenomenon with such a 
tendency to feel like this. 
Most of the mentalizing occurs in the form of narrative, we continually narrate about the mental states. 
Every feeling starts a story: what was the situation? What happened? How did a person interpret it? 
What did the person do? And every feeling starts a story about the feelings of others. In 
psychotherapy, we can always properly consider, "and what else did you feel?" Ultimately, the 
complete story behind every mental state -in its widest range- is the biography of the individual. 
Hypermentalization, when the person accepts what he or she interprets, and hypomentalization, when 
one cannot accept the views of others and has an objective and dogmatic understanding of the 
alternative perspective of his view, are two forms of automatic mentalization where the individual's 
view of one's own mind and others is challenged and changed rather than controlled explicit 
mentalization by the alternative ways (13). 
Implicit mentalization. 
This kind of mentalization is beyond words and shows the difference between implicit knowing how 
to do something and the explicit knowing. When we mentalize explicitly, we make it conscious and 
voluntary. When we mentalize implicitly, we are intuitive, process, self-conscious, and obsessive. In 
general, it is impossible to distinguish between these two kinds of subjectivism completely 
differently, and most of the two final poles are considered as processes in which the mental 
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representations are re-descriptive in them, and in the course of evolution, as well as the psychotherapy 
occur (14). 
As well as explicit mentalization, implicit mentalization occurs in the context of self and others. We 
implicitly mentalize others, for example, in conversations: we wait for others till they stop speaking 
and consider his/her point of view, in a larger extent - when things go smoothly – we do not need to 
explicitly think about it. We also implicitly mentalize others when we understand and respond to their 
emotional states: we automatically reflect their emotional states, in this process we adjust ourselves 
to their way of sitting, facial expressions and voices. If these processes were explicit, we would show 
a rigid and unhealthy situation instead of a sympathetic one. 
Similar constructs for reflective functioning. 
Mindblindness. 
This term is expressed as an antithesis for mentalization. Baron-Cohen (15) use it as a deficit in 
autism, such that the mindblindness is the basis for constant neurobiological damage. Fonagy defines 
it as a general failure in mentalization. Dynamic mindblindness may seem to be partial or transient 
failures in mentalization, for example, when they engage in intense emotional conflicts in attachment 
relationships. Therefore, all of us at times behave with varying degrees of mindblindness, and 
pasychopathological individuals show this behavior more. 
Empathy. 
Empathy includes the awareness of emotional states of distress in other people. Rogers (16) 
introduced this term to psychological therapy, and empathy is the center of attention to the extensive 




Despite the fact that the discovery of mirror neurons provides an important source of neural basis for 
the automatic and tacit experience of communicating with others; Preston and Diall (18) emphasize 
that single mirror neurons Do not create empathy. In fact, like subjectivization in broader sense of 
empathy, it shows a large extent of implicitly more responsive to revealer. Preston and the hierarchical 
dialer are suggested by sympathetic responses, in which all the mental-objective situations are similar. 
The characteristic of empathy is social recognition, in which the mental-objective excitement takes 
place without distinction of self-others. Suitable empathy also involves mental-objective emotional 
correlations, but in order to be effective, it is necessary to distinguish between self-others and 
emotional regulation, a combination of self-awareness and other-consciousness. Such empathy can 
be implied, intuitive, and self-conscious. 
Cognitive empathy is more developed than explicit imaginary capacity. In the process of explicit 
imagination, the common representation experiences is actively involved. In explicit imagination, the 
representation is deliberately produced based on memories, and these representations are actively 
serving this process. 
Although empathy is just one aspect of mentalization, it can be the most important. Sometimes when 
attempting quickly to convey the gist of mentalization, it can be said that if the concept of empathy 
is extended to include empathy for an individual, these two terms will be nearly synonyms.  
Emotional Intelligence. 
Mayer, Caruso, Salovey (19) described emotional intelligence as the ability to infer with emotions, 
and they carve out four broad domains: 
1) Perceiving and expressing emotion includes recognizing one’s emotions in relation to physical 
sensations, thoughts, and feelings as well as identifying emotion in other persons. 
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2) Accessing and simulating emotion in thought using the emotions to prioritizing thought, judgment 
and memory. 
3) Understanding and analysing emotion includes labelling emotions.  
4) Regulating emotions, which is the ability to be open to emotions as well as monitoring and 
regulating emotions reflectively and adaptively. 
Psychological mindedness and insight. 
The concept of psychological mindedness was originally developed to capture the patient's 
amenability to psychoanalytic treatment (11). Hence, psychological mindedness has a very limited 
meaning, which is "the ability of the individual to recognize the dynamic components of the psyche 
(intrapsychic) and to link these components to their own problems" (20). That is, one can relate his 
thoughts, feelings, and behaviors in order to learn the meanings and reasons for his experiences and 
behaviors. 
In its initial sense, the psychological mindedness is related to the "self" to the construe of explicit 
mentalization, but the psychological mindedness is considered as a reflection of motivation, behavior, 
thoughts, and emotions oneself and others are reflected. Although the basic concepts of psychological 
mindedness address the cognitive and intellectual orientation -capacity for insight-, the psychological 
mindedness not only covers a wide range of awareness of oneself and others, but also explicit and 
implicit aspects of mentalization that occupies much of the territory of mentalizing. 
Mindfulness. 
Mindfulness has been defined in Buddhist literature as "keeping one's consciousness to the present 
reality" (21). Brown and Ryan (22) construed mindfulness as "increasing attention and awareness to 
current experiences or current reality," which was described as "special openness or perceived 
awareness and attention". Mindfulness refers to the quality of consciousness irrespective of objects 
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of consciousness; therefore, the mindfulness overlaps with mentalization in terms of special attention 
to mental states. Hence, the work of Brown and Ryan on the mindfulness encompasses some facets 
of mentalization, for instance, includes "perceived attention from psychological states" and 
"sensitivity to current psychological processes". However, the time frame for mentalization is wider, 
in the sense that a person can mentally contemplate the past or future, while the mindfulness is focused 
present. Moreover, despite the fact that mentalizing (explicitly) is a refletive process, the mindfulness 
is interpreted as "pre-reflective, perceptual, and non-evaluative openly experiencing what is here". 
Rationality, agency. 
Explicit mentalization is the fundamental domain of our rationality, that is, our capacity for action is 
based on reason (24.23). A perfectly rational act based on the involvement of a proper range of 
considerations, thinking between alternatives, and making optimal decisions. Clinically, therapists 
urge their patients to think before they act. 
Sometimes patients erroneously equate mentalizing with thinking, that is, "using the mind". Clearly, 
thinking is far broader; we think about much more than mind. Ditto in the rationality, not all the 
reasoning are mental states. For example, a person behaves rationally before acting but does not 
necessarily mentalize. One is mentalizing when refraining from drinking and driving in order to avoid 
infuriating of one’s spouse. On the other hand, mentalization goes beyond rationality in the sense that 
it is not limited to reasoning (to the extent that mentalizing remains implicit and not deliberative).  
To the extent that it entails rationality, the mentalization increases agency, that is, the capacity for the 
initiation of behavior to reach a goal (11). Mentalizing is an example for agency in promoting self-






Mind is basically imaginative (26), and mentalizing is a form of imaginative activity. In implicit 
mentalization, we do not merely consider, we do not just look at the eyebrows that are tangled in the 
face; we see the as a scowl, and the person who was scowling as being irritated or downright 
menacing. we will define the meaning of behavior by creating descriptions in the form of creative 
stories. Most of our imagination consists of metaphorical thinking; our language is rife with it (27). 
But the explicit and creative mentalization is not limited to the language and we imaginatively conjure 
up visual and other sensory images as we strive to see, feel, and think from others’ perspectives; we 
engage in co-reasoning and same thinking (28). 
Emergence and development of reflective functioning. 
The concept of reflective functioning has been influenced not only by Freudian and Anna Freudian's 
ideas but also it stems from Klein’s thoughts on the nature of the emotion and thoughts and children’s 
substantial need for care.  
Some of Bowlby’s early writing (29) express this approach and express about the deep and inevitable 
feelings of hatred, jealousy, and fear (which are usually matched and relieved by the emotions of 
happiness, kindness and trust). In an individual with low reflective functioning skills, the range and 
severity of his emotions are typically avoided (hypo RF-stand) or expresses anger and evocative 
emotions (hyper RF-stand). In contrast, individuals with hyper reflective functioning are prone to 
experience a wide range of positive and negative emotions that are both the cause and the consequence 
of behavior. 
The other effects of the development the reflective functioning concept is considerably seen in the 
British psychoanalytic society, as evidenced in the writings of Winnicott and his creative ideas in the 
late 1980s, are evident. Any contributions Winnicott has had in his psychoanalytic theory implies his 
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deep-seated perception of what mothers do for their infants. When the infant looks at her mother, she 
can see herself, which is what she feels to be reflected in her mother's expressions. If mother is 
occupied and busy with another subject, when the baby looks at the mother, she only sees how her 
mother feels (30). In Winnicott’s view, the infant can only figure out what it really means by reflecting 
it. If the infant is allowed to feel her complete existence in a way that validates her, she will continue 
to look freely. In the term of reflective functioning, the infant is free to think and explore the mental 
and emotional world of others and continue to think. 
It seems that disorders such as conduct or borderline states have been shaped, respectively, from self-
organization without mentalizing or over-mentalizing, but this definition is simple (2). In both 
examples, there are usually differences in every situations or types of relationships. The criminal 
teenager is aware of the mental status of other members of his gang, and the person with borderline 
traits is also sensitive to emotional states of mental health professionals and family members. 
Abnormalities can be identified in higher-level of developmental theory. 
As our understanding of the mediating role of brain development and early psychosocial experiences 
increases, we can see the role of attachment relationships is greater than taking care of the newborn. 
These relationships also provide an evolutionary role in ensuring that the structures of the brain are 
organized for the proper social recognition and prepares the individual for coordination with the brain 
organization (31). 
Neuropsychological view increases the importance of processes passing intergeneration patterns of 
attachment. If the attachment relationship is a major organizer of brain development (32), then the 
determinants of attachment relationships are much more than the basic concept of security or safety 
(33). In fact, we have long been aware that intelligence is associated with early attachment security 
(34). Other studies have attracted attention to the initial attachment relationships as the organizer of 
attentional systems (35). Moreover, we knew that the infant's attachment was rare between behaviors 
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showing little heritability (36). This is an emphasis on the evolutionary goal that consider the effect 
of the environment and the inherent social transmission. 
These studies contrast with the literature on exploring which examination should evaluate reflective 
functioning role in attachment and social development. Reflective functioning is mentalization, which 
is measured in an attachment context. The reflective functioning is part of a complex set of 
capabilities that includes interpretation in the center (37).  
Interpretation specifically includes the psychological sharing of experiences, information, and 
emotions. This requires an "international stance" in which the person treats to the object’s behavior 
as a rational sign of beliefs and desires (38). The understanding of society (or societies, working 
groups, families) depends on our ability to see people according to their minds that evoked by 
thoughts, feelings, aspirations, beliefs and desires. Ultimately, if we cannot deal with people who we 
work or have relationship with, mentalized understanding of others will be impossible. Understanding 
oneself and others’ actions are the abilities that are used with the same set of neural mechanisms (39). 
Mentalization capacity, along with many other socio-cultural capacities, emanates from the 
experience of social interaction with a caregiver. Understanding minds without the experience of 
being conceived as a person with a mind is difficult. Some may claim that giving such responsibility 
on infant-caregiver relationship is extreme.  
If social recognition was very sensitive to the ups and downs of the relationship between mother and 
her baby, does "nature" create such a system for social recognition? Indeed, we must note that only 
the recent social transformation of a baby is in the hands of an adult, to an average of four adults 
associated with the child who invest in their survival (40). Allo-parenting is a feature of human 
species. Therefore, it seems appropriate to expect from an evolutionary perspective that each of us 
have access to more than one adult with a particular contribution to the emergence of mental 
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capacities to deal with us as potential minds, and pave the way for the sensitive and adaptive formation 
process of emotional control, selective attention and mentalization (41). 
CONCLUSIONS. 
This project was to investigate the definition, formulation of the reflective functioning structure, and 
ultimately, its effect on transformation, cognition, pathology and treatment. The reflective functioning 
appears to be synonym with mentalization, but there are some minor differences that have been 
addressed. Since the person form the mentalization and consequently reflective functioning 
interacting with others, and in particular, the main caregivers, it is essential to consider it in 
investigating development, pathology of psychological and cognitive problems, as well as the 
treatment and mental interventions. 
According to Bateman and Fonagy (42), mentalization, the capacity to think about mental states, is 
in a way separate from actions, and ultimately leads to action. We mentalize to stimulate a process 
that is part of a psychological equilibrium. The process of mentalization occurs in the dynamic context 
of parent-child relationship. In such a relationship, feelings and thoughts, aspirations and beliefs can 
be experienced by the child in a special way and can be treated with one another. One-sided approach 
means that one understands them through the representation of events and incidents, but on the other 
hand, it does not take into account the event as the physical reality occurs. Moreover, mentalization 
emerges along with a body of attachment relationships called reflective functioning (43). 
Reflective functioning is a process by which one can measure the attachment mentalizing. That is, 
the capacity to conceive mental states that interpret or anticipate one’s or others’ behavior. 
Mentalizing capacity, along with the common capacities of emotion regulation and attention 
management mechanisms, is a key determinant for self-organization and is found in the context of 
initial attachment relationships (44). Therefore, disturbances in attachment relationships disrupts the 
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normal appearance of these basic cognitive-social capacities and creates profound vulnerabilities in 
the context of social relationships. 
The defect in mentalization, especially in reflective functioning, leads to fundamental interpersonal 
problems (45). If one fails to understand his emotions, thoughts, wishes and beliefs, and also to be 
incapable of understanding his mental representations of the minds of others, encounters difficulties 
in relationship. This issue has been addressed in any approach of pathological psychology. 
Along with these therapies, clear therapies have been developed to help the patient to improve or 
enhance their reflective capacity, such as: mentalizing-based therapy by increasing the attention 
capacity to one’s and others’ mental states and the interpretation of behaviors based on them (46). 
There are many practices in metacognitive therapy to challenge negative and positive beliefs about 
cognitive processes and help the patient to manage thinking about how he thinks (47) and in 
mindfulness-based cognitive therapy live in the moment, and this is how the patient learns to focus 
his attention on present moment (48). In each of these therapies, various methods and techniques for 
increasing the mental capacity of individuals are used to focus on the mentalization. Therefore, 
regardless of the type of psychotherapy, it is essential to consider how to improve mentalizing 
capacity during the course of treatment. 
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